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Abstract: Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) is emerging as a major field aimed at
the protection of automated ML systems against security threats. The majority of work in
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1. Introduction
Over the last decade, an increasing number of processes are being automated through machine
learning (ML) algorithms (Breiman, 2001). It is essential that these algorithms are robust and
reliable if we are to trust operations based on their output. State-of-the-art ML algorithms
perform extraordinarily well on standard data, but have recently been shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial examples, data instances targeted at fooling those algorithms (Goodfellow et al.,
2015). The presence of adaptive adversaries has been pointed out in areas such as spam detection
(Zeager et al., 2017); fraud detection (Ko lcz and Teo, 2009); and computer vision (Goodfellow
et al., 2015). In those contexts, algorithms should acknowledge the presence of possible adver-
saries to defend against their data manipulations. Comiter (2019) provides a review from the
policy perspective showing how many AI societal systems, including content filters, military
systems, law enforcement systems and autonomous driving systems (ADS), are susceptible and
vulnerable to attacks. As a motivating example, consider the case of fraud detection (Bolton
and Hand, 2002). As ML algorithms are incorporated to such task, fraudsters learn how to
evade them. For instance, they could find out that making a huge transaction increases the
probability of being detected and start issuing several smaller transactions rather than a single
large transaction.
As a fundamental underlying hypothesis, ML systems rely on using independent and identi-
cally distributed (iid) data for both training and testing. However, security aspects in ML, part
of the field of adversarial machine learning (AML), question this iid hypothesis given the pres-
ence of adaptive adversaries ready to intervene in the problem to modify the data and obtain a
benefit. These perturbations induce differences between the training and test distributions.
Stemming from the pioneering work in adversarial classification (AC) in Dalvi et al. (2004),
the prevailing paradigm in AML to model the confrontation between learning-based systems and
adversaries has been game theory (Menache and Ozdaglar, 2011). This entails well-known com-
mon knowledge (CK) hypothesis (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 2004) which are doubtful
in security applications as adversaries try to hide and conceal information.
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As pointed out in Fan et al. (2019), there is a need for a principled framework that guarantees
robustness of ML against adversarial manipulations in a principled way. In this paper we aim
at formulating such framework. After providing an overview of key concepts and methods in
AML emphasising the underlying game theoretic assumptions, we suggest an alternative formal
Bayesian decision theoretic approach based on Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA), illustrating it
in supervised and reinforcement learning problems. We end up with a research agenda for the
proposed framework.
2. Motivating examples
Two motivating examples serve us to illustrate key issues in AML.
2.1. Attacking computer vision algorithms
Vision algorithms are at the core of many AI systems such as ADS (Bojarski et al., 2016) and
(McAllister et al., 2017). The simplest and most notorious attack examples to such algorithms
consist of modifications of images in such a way that the alteration becomes imperceptible to
the human eye, yet drives a model trained on millions of images to misclassify the modified
ones, with potentially relevant security consequences.
Example. With a relatively simple convolutional neural network model, we are able to ac-
curately predict 99% of the handwritten digits in the MNIST data set (LeCun et al., 1998).
However, if we attack those data with the fast gradient sign method in Szegedy et al. (2014),
its accuracy is reduced to 62%. Figure 1 provides an example of an original MNIST image and
a perturbed one. Although to our eyes both images look like a 2, our classifier rightly identifies
a 2 in the first case (Fig. 1a), whereas it suggests a 7 after the perturbation (Fig. 1b).
(a) Original image (b) Perturbed image
Fig 1: An original input and its attacked version.
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This type of attacks are easily built through low cost computational methods. However, they
require the attacker to have precise knowledge about the architecture and weights of the corre-
sponding predictive model. This is debatable in security settings, a main driver of this paper.
2.2. Attacking spam detection algorithms
Consider spam detection problems, an example of content filter systems. We employ the utility
sensitive naive Bayes (NB) classifier, a standard spam detection approach (Song et al., 2009),
studying its degraded performance under the 1 Good Word Insertion attacks in Naveiro et al.
(2019a). In this case, the adversary just attacks spam emails adding to them a good word, that
is, a word which is common in legit emails but not in spam ones.
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Example. We use the Spambase Data Set from the UCI ML repository (Lichman, 2013).
Accuracy and False Positive and Negative Rates are reported in Table 1, estimated via repeated
hold-out validation over 100 repetitions (Kim, 2009). We provide as well the standard deviation
of each metric, also estimated through repeated hold-out validation.
Accuracy FPR FNR
NB-Plain 0.886± 0.009 0.680± 0.100 0.19± 0.02
NB-Tainted 0.761± 0.101 0.680± 0.100 0.500± 0.250
Table 1
Performance of utility sensitive NB in clean and attacked data.
NB-Plain and NB-Tainted refer to results of NB on clean and attacked data, respectively.
Observe how the presence of an adversary degrades NB accuracy: FPR coincides for NB-Plain
and NB-Tainted as the adversary is not modifying innocent instances. However, false negatives
undermine NB-Tainted performance, as the classifier is not able to identify a large proportion
of attacked spam emails. 4
Both examples show how the performance of ML based systems may degrade under attacks.
This suggests the need to take into account the presence of adversaries as done in AML.
3. Adversarial Machine Learning: a review
In this section, we present key results and concepts in AML. Further perspectives may be found
in recent reviews by Vorobeychik and Kantarcioglu (2018), Joseph et al. (2019), Biggio and Roli
(2018), Dasgupta and Collins (2019) and Zhou et al. (2018). We focus on key ideas in the brief
history of the field to motivate a reflection leading to our alternative approach in Sections 4 and
5. We remain at a conceptual level, with relevant modelling and computational ideas in Section
4.
3.1. Adversarial classification
Classification is one of the most widely used instances of supervised learning (Bishop, 2006).
Most efforts in this field have focused on obtaining more accurate algorithms which, however,
have largely ignored the presence of adversaries who actively manipulate data to fool a classifier
in search of a benefit. Dalvi et al. (2004) introduced adversarial classification (AC), a pioneering
approach to enhance classification algorithms when an adversary is present. They view AC as
a game between a classifier, also referred to as defender (D, she), and an adversary, (A, he).
The classifier aims at finding an optimal classification strategy against A’s optimal attacks.
Computing Nash equilibria (NE) in such general games quickly becomes very complex. Thus,
they propose a forward myopic version in which D first assumes that the data is untainted,
computing her optimal classifier; then, A deploys his optimal attack against it; subsequently, D
implements the best response classifier against such attack, and so on. This approach assumes
CK, or the assumption that all parameters of both players are known to each other. Although
standard in game theory, this assumption is actually unrealistic in the security settings typical
of AML.
Stemming from it, there has been an important literature in AC reviewed in Biggio et al.
(2014) or Li and Vorobeychik (2014). Subsequent approaches have focused on analyzing at-
tacks over algorithms and upgrading their robustness against such attacks. To that end, strong
assumptions about the adversary are typically made. For instance, Lowd and Meek (2005)
consider that the adversary can send membership queries to the classifier to issue optimal at-
tacks, then proving the vulnerability of linear classifiers. A few methods have been proposed
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to robustify classification algorithms in adversarial environments, most of them focused on
application-specific domains, as Ko lcz and Teo (2009) in spam detection. Vorobeychik and Li
(2014) study the impact of randomization schemes over classifiers against attacks proposing
an optimal randomization defense. Other approaches have focused on improving Dalvi et al.
(2004) model but, as far as we know, none got rid of the unrealistic CK assumptions. As an
example, Kantarcıog˘lu et al. (2011) use a Stackelberg game in which both players know each
other’s payoff functions.
3.2. Adversarial prediction
An important source of AML cases are Adversarial Prediction Problems (APPs), Bru¨ckner and
Scheffer (2011).They focus on building predictive models where an adversary exercises some
control over the data generation process, jeopardising standard prediction techniques. APPs
model the interaction between the predictor and the adversary as a two agent game, a defender
that aims at learning a parametric predictive model and an adversary trying to transform the
distribution governing data at training time. The agents’ costs depend on both the predictive
model and the adversarial data transformation. Both agents aim at optimizing their operational
costs, which is a function of their expected losses under the perturbed data distribution. As this
distribution is unknown, the agents actually optimize their regularized empirical costs, based
on the training data. The specific optimization problem depends on the case considered.
First, in Stackelberg prediction games, Bru¨ckner and Scheffer (2011) assume full information
of the attacker about the predictive model used by the defender who, in addition, is assumed
to have perfect information about the adversary’s costs and action space. D acts first choosing
her parameter; then, A, after observing this decision, chooses the optimal data transformation.
Finding NE in these games requires solving a bi-level optimization problem, optimizing the
defender’s cost function subject to the adversary optimizing his, after observing the defender’s
choice. As nested optimization problems are intrinsically hard, the authors restrict to simple
classes where analytical solutions can be found. 1 On the other hand, in Nash prediction games
(Bru¨ckner et al., 2012) both agents act simultaneously. The main concern is then seeking for
NE. The authors provide conditions for their existence and uniqueness in specific classes of
games.
3.3. Adversarial unsupervised learning
Much less AML work is available in relation with unsupervised learning. A relevant proposal
is Kos et al. (2018) who describe adversarial attacks to generative models such as variational
autoencoders (VAEs) or generative adversarial networks used in density estimation. Their focus
is on slightly perturbing the input to the models so that the reconstructed output is completely
different from the original input.
To the best of our knowledge, Biggio et al. (2013) first studied clustering under adversarial
disturbances. They suggest a framework to create attacks during training that significantly
alter cluster assignments, as well as an obfuscation attack that slightly perturbs an input to be
clustered in a predefined assignment, showing that single-link hierarchical clustering is sensitive
to these attacks.
Lastly, adversarial attacks on autoregressive (AR) models have started to attract interest.
Alfeld et al. (2016) describe an attacker manipulating the inputs to drive the latent space of
a linear AR model towards a region of interest. Papernot et al. (2016) propose adversarial
perturbations over recurrent neural networks.
1More recently, Naveiro and Insua (2019) provide efficient gradient methods to approximate solutions in more
general problems.
AML from ARA 5
3.4. Adversarial reinforcement learning
The prevailing solution approach in reinforcement learning (RL) is Q-learning (Sutton et al.,
1998). Deep RL has faced an incredible growth (Silver et al., 2017); however, the corresponding
systems may be targets of attacks and robust methods are needed (Huang et al., 2017).
An AML related field of interest is multi-agent RL (Bus¸oniu et al., 2010). Single-agent RL
methods fail in multi-agent settings, as they do not take into account the non-stationarity due
to the other agents’ actions: Q-learning may lead to suboptimal results. Thus, we must reason
about and forecast the adversaries’ behaviour. Several methods have been proposed in the AI
literature (Albrecht and Stone, 2018). A dominant approach draws on fictitious play (Brown,
1951) and consists of assessing the other agents computing their frequencies of choosing various
actions. Using explicit representations of the other agents’ beliefs about their opponents could
lead to an infinite hierarchy of decision making problems, as explained in Section 5.3.
The application of these tools to Q-learning in multi-agent settings remains largely unex-
plored. Relevant extensions have rather focused on Markov games. Three well-known solutions
are minimax-Q learning (Littman, 1994), which solves at each iteration a minimax problem;
Nash-Q learning (Hu and Wellman, 2003), which generalizes to the non-zero sum case; or friend-
or-foe-Q learning (Littman, 2001), in which the agent knows in advance whether her opponent
is an adversary or a collaborator.
3.5. Adversarial examples
One of the most influential concepts triggering the recent interest in AML are adversarial
examples. They were introduced by Szegedy et al. (2014) within neural network (NN) models,
as perturbed data instances obtained through solving certain optimization problem. NNs are
highly sensitive to such examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
The usual framework for robustifying models against these examples is adversarial training
(AT) (Madry et al., 2018), based on solving a bi-level optimization problem whose objective
function is the empirical risk of a model under worst case data perturbations. AT approximates
the inner optimization through a projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm, ensuring that
the perturbed input falls within a tolerable boundary. 2 The complexity of this attack depends
on the chosen norm. However, recent pointers urge modellers to depart from using norm based
approaches (Carlini et al., 2019) and develop more realistic attack models, as in Brown et al.
(2017) adversarial patches.
3.6. The AML pipeline
The above subsections reviewed key developments in AML from a historical perspective. We
summarise now the pipeline typically followed to improve security of ML systems (Biggio and
Roli, 2018).
Modelling threats. This activity is critical to ensure ML security in adversarial environ-
ments. In general, we should assess three attacker features.
First, we should consider his goals, which vary depending on the setting, ranging from money
to causing fatalities, going through damaging reputation (Couce-Vieira et al., 2019). Prior to
deploying an ML system, it is crucial to guarantee its robustness against attackers with the
most common goals. For instance, in fraud detection the attacker usually obfuscates fraudulent
transactions to make the system classify them as legitimate ones in search of an economic
2It is possible to frame the inner optimization problem as a mixed integer linear program and use general
purpose optimizers to search for adversarial examples, see Kolter and Madry (2018). Note though that for
moderate to large networks in mainstream tasks, exact optimization is still computationally intractable.
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benefit: a fraud detection system should be robust against such attacks. In general, these are
classified following two criteria regarding their goals: violation type and attack specificity. For
the first criterion, we distinguish between integrity violations, aimed at moving the prediction of
particular instances towards the attacker’s target, e.g. have malicious samples misclassified as
legitimate; availability violations, aimed at increasing the predictive error to make the system
unusable; and privacy violations (a.k.a, exploratory attacks) to gain information about the ML
system. In relation with the second one, we distinguish between targeted, which address just
a few, even one, defenders, and indiscriminate attacks, affecting many defenders in a random
manner.
Next, we consider that at the time of attacking, the adversary could have knowledge about
different aspects of the ML system such as the training data used, or the features. Thus, we
classify adversarial threats depending on which aspects is the attacker assumed to have knowl-
edge about. At one end of the spectrum, we find white box or perfect knowledge attacks: the
adversary knows every aspect of the ML system. This is almost never the case in actual scenar-
ios, except perhaps for insiders. Yet they could be useful in sequential settings where the ML
system moves first, training an algorithm to find its specific parameters. The adversary, who
moves afterwards, has some time to observe the behaviour of the system and learn about it. 3
At the other end, black box or zero knowledge attacks assume that the adversary has capabilities
to query the system but does not have any information about the data, the feature space or
the particular algorithms used. This is the most reasonable assumption in which attacking and
defending decisions are eventually made simultaneously. In between attacks are called gray box
or limited knowledge. This is the most common type of attacks in security settings, especially
when attacking and defending decisions are made sequentially but there is private information
that the intervening agents are not willing to share.
Finally, we classify the attacks depending on the capabilities of the adversary to influence on
data. In some cases, he may obfuscate training data to induce errors during operation, called
poisoning attacks. On the other hand, evasion attacks have no influence on training data, but
perform modifications during operation, for instance when trying to evade a detection system.
These data alteration or crafting activities are the typical ones in AML and we designate them
as coming from a data-fiddler. But there could be attackers capable of changing the underlying
structure of the problem, affecting process parameters, called structural attackers. Moreover,
some adversaries could be making decisions in parallel to those of the defender with the agents’
losses depending on both decisions, which we term parallel attackers. 4
Simulating attacks. The standard approach, Biggio and Roli (2018), formalizes poisoning
and evasion attacks in terms of constrained optimization problems with different assumptions
about the adversary’s knowledge, goals and capabilities. In general, the objective function in
such problems assesses attack effectiveness, taking into account the attacker’s goals and knowl-
edge. The constraints frame assumptions such as the adversary wanting to avoid detection or
having a maximum attacking budget. 5
Protecting learning algorithms. Two types of defence methods have been proposed. Reac-
tive defences aim to mitigate or eliminate the effects of an eventual attack. They include timely
detection of attacks, e.g. Naveiro et al. (2019b); frequent retraining of learning algorithms; or
verification of algorithmic decisions by experts. Proactive defences aim to prevent attack execu-
tion. They can entail security-by-design approaches such as explicitly accounting for adversarial
3However, although the adversary may have some knowledge, assuming that this is perfect is not realistic and
has been criticized, even in the pioneering Dalvi et al. (2004).
4Some attackers could combine the three capabilities in certain scenarios. For example, in a cybersecurity
problem an attacker might add spam modifying its proportion (structural); alter some spam messages (data-
fiddler); and, in addition, undertake his own business decisions (parallel).
5A more natural and general formulation of the attacker’s problem is through a statistical decision theoretic
perspective (French and Rios Insua, 2000), see Sections 4 and 5.
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manipulations, e.g., Naveiro et al. (2019a), or developing provably secure algorithms against
specific perturbations (e.g., Gowal et al. (2018)); or security-by-obscurity techniques such as
randomization of the algorithm response, or gradient obfuscation to make attacks less likely to
succeed (Athalye et al., 2018).
3.7. General comments
We have provided an overview of key concepts in AML. Practically all ML methodologies have
been touched upon from an adversarial perspective including, to quote a few approaches not
mentioned above, logistic regression (Feng et al., 2014); support vector machines (Biggio et al.,
2012); or latent Dirichlet allocations (Mei and Zhu, 2015). As mentioned, it is very relevant from
an applied point of view in areas like national security and cybersecurity. Of major importance
in AML is the cleverhans6 (Papernot et al., 2018) library, built on top of the tensorflow
framework, aimed at accelerating research in developing new attack threats and more robust
defences for deep neural models.
This is a difficult area which is rapidly evolving and leading to an arms race in which the
community alternates a cycle of proposing attacks and implementing defences that deal with
the previous ones (Athalye et al., 2018). Thus, it is important to develop sound techniques. Note
though, that stemming from the pioneering Dalvi et al. (2004), most of AML research has been
framed within a standard game theory approach pervaded by NE and refinements. However,
these entail CK assumptions which are hard to maintain in the security contexts typical of
AML applications. We could argue that CK is too commonly assumed. We propose a decision
theoretic based methodology to solve AML problems, adopting an ARA perspective to model
the confrontation between attackers and defenders mitigating questionable CK assumptions,
Rios Insua et al. (2009) and Banks et al. (2015).
4. ARA templates for AML
ARA makes operational the Bayesian approach to games, Kadane and Larkey (1982) and Raiffa
(1982), facilitating a procedure to predict adversarial decisions, simulating them to obtain fore-
casts and protecting the learning system, as we formalise in Section 4.4. We provide before a
comparison of game-theoretic and ARA concepts over three template AML models associated,
respectively, to white, black and gray box attacks. They constitute basic structures which may
be simplified or made more complex, through removing or adding nodes, and combined to ac-
commodate specific AML problems. In all models, there is a defender who chooses her decision
d ∈ D and an attacker who chooses his attack a ∈ A. In the AML jargon, the defender would be
the learning system (or the organisation deploying it) and the decisions she makes could refer to
the various choices required, including the data set used, the models chosen, or the algorithms
employed to estimate the parameters. In turn, the attacker would be the attacking organisation
(or their corresponding attacking system); his decisions refer to the data sets chosen to attack or
the period at which he decides to make it, but could also refer to structural or parallel decisions
as in Section 3.6. The involved agents are assumed to maximise expected utility (or minimise
expected loss) (French and Rios Insua, 2000).
We use bi-agent influence diagrams (BAIDS) (Banks et al., 2015) to describe the problems:
they include circular nodes representing uncertainties; hexagonal utility nodes, modelling pref-
erences over consequences; and, square nodes portraying decisions. The arrows point to decision
nodes (meaning that such decisions are made knowing the values of predecessors) or chance and
value nodes (the corresponding events or consequences are influenced by predecessors). Different
colours suggest issues relevant to just one of the agents (white, defender; gray, attacker); striped
ones are relevant to both agents.
6https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans
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4.1. Sequential defend-attack games
We start with sequential games. D chooses her decision d and, then, A chooses his attack a, after
having observed d. This exemplifies white-box attacks, as the attacker has full information of
D’s action at the time of making his decision. As an example, a classifier chooses and estimates
a parametric classification algorithm and an attacker, who has access to the specific algorithm,
sends examples to try to fool the classifier. These games have received various names like
sequential Defend-Attack (Brown et al., 2006) or Stackelberg (Gibbons, 1992). Their BAID is
in Figure 2. Arc D-A reflects that D’s choice is observed by A. The consequences for both
systems depend on an attack outcome θ ∈ Θ. Each agent has its assessment on the probability
of θ, which depends on d and a, respectively called pD(θ|d, a) and pA(θ|d, a). Similarly, their
utility functions are uD(d, θ) and uA(a, θ).
ΘD A
UD UA
Fig 2: Basic two player sequential defend-attack game
The basic game theoretic solution does not require A to know D’s judgements, as he observes
her decisions. However, D must know those of A, the CK condition in this case. For its solu-
tion, we compute both agents’ expected utilities at node Θ: ψA(a, d) =
∫
uA(a, θ) pA(θ|d, a) dθ,
and ψD(a, d) =
∫
uD(d, θ) pD(θ|d, a) dθ. Next, we find a∗(d) = arg maxa∈A ψA(d, a), A’s best
response to D’s action d. Then, D’s optimal action is d∗GT = arg maxd∈D ψD(d, a
∗(d)). The pair
(d∗GT, a
∗(d∗GT)) is a NE and, indeed, a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Example. The Stackelberg game in Bru¨ckner and Scheffer (2011), Section 3.2, modeling the
confrontation in an APP is a particular instance in which costs are minimized with no uncer-
tainty about the outcome θ. D chooses the parameters d of a predictive model. A observes d and
chooses the transformation, converting data T into a(T ). Let ĉi(d, a(T )) be the (regularized)
empirical cost of the i-th agent, i ∈ {A,D}. Then, they propose a pair [d∗, a∗(T (d∗))] solving
arg min
d
ĉD(d, a
∗(T (d)))
s.t. a∗(T (d)) ∈ arg min
a(T )
ĉA(d, a(T )),
which provides a NE. 4
Example. Adversarial examples can be cast as well through sequential games. A finds the
best attack which leads to perturbed data instances obtained from solving the problem
min
‖δ‖≤
ĉA(hθ(a(x)), y),
with a(x) = x+ δ, a suitable perturbation of the original data instance x; hθ(x), the output of
a predictive model with parameters θ; and ĉA(hθ(x), y) = −ĉD(hθ(x), y), the cost of classifying
x as of being of class hθ(x) when the actual label is y.
In turn, robustifying models against those perturbations through AT aims at solving the
problem minθ E(x,y)∼D
[
max‖δx‖≤ ĉD(hθ(a(x)), y)
]
: we minimize the empirical risk of a model
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under worst case perturbations of the data D. The inner maximization problem is solved through
PGD, with iterations xt+1 = ΠB(x)(xt − α∇xĉA(hθ(xt), y)), where Π is a projection operator
ensuring that the perturbed input falls within a tolerable boundary B(x). After T iterations, we
make a(x) = xT and optimize with respect to θ. Madry et al. (2018) argue that the PGD attack
is the strongest one using only gradient information from the target model; however, there has
been evidence that it is not sufficient for full defence of neural models (Gowal et al., 2018). The
complexity of the above attack depends on the chosen norm; for instance, if we resort to small
perturbations under `∞ norm, the update simplifies to x := x−  sign∇xĉA(hθ(x), y), making it
attractive because of its low computational burden. The `2 norm can also be considered, leading
to updates x := x−  ∇xĈA(hθ(x),y)‖∇xĈA(hθ(x),y)‖2 . 4
The above CK condition is weakened if we assume only partial information, leading to games
under incomplete information (Harsanyi, 1967), but we defer their discussion until Section 4.3.
These CK conditions, and those used under incomplete information, are doubtful as we do not
actually have available the attacker his judgements. Moreover, they could lack robustness to
perturbations in such judgements, Ekin et al. (2019).
Alternatively, we perform a Bayesian decision theoretic approach based on ARA. We weaken
the CK assumption: the defender does not know (pA, uA) and faces the problem in Figure 3a.
To solve it, she needs pD(a|d), her assessment of the probability that A will implement attack
a after observing d. Then, her expected utility would be ψD(d) =
∫
ψD(a, d) pD(a|d) da with
optimal decision d∗ARA = arg maxd∈D ψD(d). This solution does not necessarily correspond to a
NE (both solutions are based on different information and assumptions).7
ΘD A
UD
(a) Decision problem seen by defender.
ΘD A
UA
(b) Defender analysis of attacker problem.
Fig 3: Influence Diagrams for defender and attacker problems.
To elicit pD(a|d),D benefits from modeling A’s problem, with his ID in Figure 3b. For this, she
would use all information available about pA and uA; her uncertainty about (pA, uA) is modelled
through a distribution F = (UA, PA) over the space of utilities and probabilities. This induces
a distribution over A’s expected utility, where his random expected utility would be ΨA(a, d) =∫
UA(a, θ)PA(θ|a, d) dθ. Then, D would find pD(a|d) = PF [a = arg maxx∈AΨA(x, d)], in the
discrete case and, similarly, in the continuous one. In general, we would use Monte Carlo (MC)
simulation to approximate pD(a|d).
4.2. Simultaneous defend-attack games
Consider next simultaneous games: the agents decide their actions without knowing the one
chosen by each other. Black-box attacks are assimilated to them. As an example, a defender fits
a classification algorithm; an attacker, who has no information about it, sends tainted examples
to try to outguess the classifier. Their basic template is in Fig. 4.
7See a cybersecurity example in Rios Insua et al. (2019).
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ΘD A
UD UA
Fig 4: Basic two player simultaneous defend-attack game.
Suppose the judgements from both agents, (uD, pD) and (uA, pA) respectively, are disclosed.
Then, both A and D know the expected utility that a pair (d, a) would provide them, ψA(d, a)
and ψD(d, a). A NE (d
∗, a∗) in this game satisfies ψD(d∗, a∗) ≥ ψD(d, a∗) ∀ d ∈ D and ψA(d∗, a∗) ≥
ψA(d
∗, a) ∀ a ∈ A.
Example. Nash prediction games are particular instances of simultaneous defend-attack games
with sure outcomes. As in an APP, agents minimize (regularized empirical) costs, ĉD(d, a(T ))
and ĉA(d, a(T )), with a(T ) being the attacked dataset. Under CK of both players’ cost func-
tions, a NE [d∗, a∗(T )] satisfies d∗ ∈ arg mind ĈD(d, a∗(T )), a∗(T ) ∈ arg mina(T ) ĈA(d∗, a(T )).
4
If utilities and probabilities are not CK, we may proceed modelling the game as one with
incomplete information using the notion of types: each player will have a type known to him
but not to the opponent, representing private information. Such type τi ∈ Ti determines the
agent’s utility ui(d, θ, τi) and probability pi(θ|d, a, τi), i ∈ {A,D}. Harsanyi proposes Bayes-
Nash equilibria (BNE) as their solutions, still under a strong CK assumption: the adversaries’
beliefs about types are CK through a common prior pi(τD, τA) (moreover, the players’ beliefs
about other uncertainties in the problem are also CK). Define strategy functions by associating
a decision with each type, d : τD → d(τD) ∈ D, a : τA → a(τA) ∈ A. D’s expected utility
associated with a pair of strategies (d, a), given her type τD ∈ TD, is
ψD(d(τD), a, τD) =
∫ ∫
uD(d(τD), θ, τD)pD(θ|d(τD), a(τA), τD)pi(τA|τD) dτAdθ.
Similarly, we compute the attacker’s expected utility ψA(d, a(τA), τA). Then, a BNE is a pair
(d∗, a∗) of strategy functions satisfying
ψD(d
∗(τD), a∗, τD) ≥ ψD(d(τD), a∗, τD), ∀ τD
ψA(d
∗, a∗(τA), τA) ≥ ψA(d∗, a(τA), τA), ∀ τA
for every d and every a, respectively.
The common prior assumptions are still unrealistic in AML security contexts. We thus weaken
them in supporting D. She should maximize her expected utility through
(1) d∗ = arg max
d∈D
∫ ∫
uD(d, θ)pD(θ | d, a)piD(a)dθda.
where piD(a) models her beliefs about the attacker’s decision a, which we need to assess. Suppose
D thinks thatAmaximizes expected utility, a∗ = arg maxa∈A
∫ [∫
uA(a, θ)
]
pA(θ|d, a) dθpiA(d) dd.
In general, she will be uncertain about A’s (uA, pA, piA) required inputs. If we model all informa-
tion available to her about it through a probability distribution F ∼ (UA, PA,ΠA), mimicking
(1), we propagate such uncertainty to compute the distribution
(2) A | D ∼ arg max
a∈A
∫ [∫
UA(a, θ) PA(θ | d, a) dθ
]
ΠA(D = d) dd.
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(UA, PA) could be directly elicited from D. However, eliciting ΠA may require further analysis
leading to an upper level of recursive thinking: she would need to think about how A analyzes
her problem (this is why we condition in (2) by the distribution of D). In the above, in order
for D to assess (2), she would elicit (UA, PA) from her viewpoint, and assess ΠA(D) through
the analysis of her decision problem, as thought by A. This reduces the assessment of ΠA(D)
to computing D | A1 ∼ arg maxd∈D
∫ ∫
UD(d, θ) PD(θ | d, a)dθ ΠD(A1 = a) da, assuming she
is able to assess ΠD(A
1), where A1 represents A’s random decision within D’s second level
of recursive thinking. For this, D needs to elicit (UD, PD) ∼ G, representing her knowledge
about how A estimates uD(d, a) and pD(θ|d, a), when she analyzes how the attacker thinks
about her decision problem. Again, eliciting ΠD(A
1) might require further thinking from D,
leading to a recursion of nested models, connected with the level-k thinking concept in Stahl
and Wilson (1994), which would stop at a level in which D lacks the information necessary
to assess the corresponding distributions. At such point, she could assign a non-informative
distribution (French and Rios Insua, 2000). Further details may be seen in Rios and Rios Insua
(2012).
4.3. Sequential defend-attack games with private information
Our final template is the sequential Defend-Attack model with defender private information.
Gray-box attacks are assimilated to them. As an example, a defender estimates the parameters
of a classification algorithm and an attacker, with no access to the algorithm but knowing the
data used to train it, sends examples to try to fool the classifier. Fig. 5 depicts the template,
with private information represented by V . Arc V −D reflects that v is known by D when she
makes her decision; the lack of arc V −A, that v is not known by A when making his decision.
The uncertainty about the outcome θ depends on the actions by A and D, as well as on V . The
utility functions are uD(d, θ, v) and uA(a, θ, v).
ΘD A
UD UAV
Fig 5: Basic template for sequential defend-attack game with private information.
Standard game theory solves this model as a signaling game (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti,
2002). For a more realistic approach, we weaken the required CK assumptions. Assume for now
that D has assessed pD(θ|d, a, v), uD(d, θ, v) and pD(a|d). Then, she obtains her optimal defence
through
At node Θ, compute for each (d, a, v), ψD(d, a, v) =
∫
uD(d, θ, v) pD(θ | d, a, v) dθ.
At node A, compute (d, v)→ ψD(d, v) =
∫
ψD(d, a, v) pD(a | d) da
At node D, solve v → d∗(v) = arg maxd∈D ψD(d, v).
To assess pD(a|d), D could solve A’s problem from her perspective. As A does not know v, his
uncertainty is represented through pA(v), describing his (prior) beliefs about v. Arrow V −D
can be inverted to obtain pA(v|d). Note that we would still need to assess pA(d|v) for this.
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Should D know A’s utility function uA(a, θ, v) and probabilities pA(θ|d, a, v) and pA(v|d), she
would anticipate his attack a∗(d) for any d ∈ D by
At node Θ, compute for each (d, a, v), ψA(d, a, v) =
∫
uA(d, θ, v) pi(θ | d, a, v) dθ.
At node V , compute for each (d, a), ψA(d, a) =
∫
ψA(d, a, v) pA(v | d) dv.
At node A, solve d→ a∗(d) = arg maxa∈A ψA(d, a).
However, D does not know (pA, uA). She has beliefs about them, say F ∼ (PA, UA), which
induce distributions ΨA(d, a, v) and ΨA(d, a) on A’s expected utilities through
ΨA(d, a, v) =
∫
UA(a, θ, v) PA(θ | d, a, v) dθ, ΨA(d, a) =
∫
ΨA(d, a, v) PA(v | d) dv.
Then, D’s predictive distribution about A’s response to her defense choice d would be defined
through
pD(a|d) = PF
[
a = arg max
x∈A
ΨA(d, x)
]
, ∀a ∈ A.
To sum up, the elicitation of (PA(θ|d, a, v), PA(v|d), UA(a, θ, v)) allows the defender to solve
her problem of assessing pD(a|d). The defender may have enough information to directly assess
PA(θ|d, a, v) and UA(a, θ, v). Yet the assessment of PA(v|d) requires a deeper analysis, since it
has a strategic component, and would lead to a recursion as in Section 4.2, as detailed in Rios
and Rios Insua (2012).
4.4. A decision theoretic pipeline for AML
Based on the three templates, we revisit now the AML pipeline in Section 3.6 proposing an
ARA based decision theoretic approach with the same steps.
1. Model system threats. This entails modelling the attacker problem from the defender
perspective through an influence diagram (ID). The attacker key features are his goals, knowl-
edge and capabilities. Assessing these require determining which are the actions that he may
undertake and the utility that he perceives when performing a specific action, given a defender’s
strategy. The output is the set of attacker’s decision nodes, together with the value node and
arcs indicating how his utility depends on his decisions and those of the defender. Assessing the
attacker knowledge entails looking for relevant information that he may have when performing
the attack, and his degree of knowledge about this information, as we do not assume CK. This
entails not only a modelling activity, but also a security assessment of the ML system to de-
termine which of its elements are accessible to the attacker. The outputs are the uncertainty
nodes of the attacker ID, the arcs connecting them and those ending in the decision nodes,
indicating the information available to A when attacking. Finally, identifying his capabilities
requires determining which part of the defender problem the attacker has influence on. This
provides the way the attacker ID connects with that of the defender.
2. Simulating attacks. Based on step 1, a mechanism is required to simulate reasonable at-
tacks. The state of the art solution assumes that the attacker will be acting NE, given strong CK
hypothesis. The ARA methodology relaxes such assumptions, through a procedure to simulate
adversarial decisions. Starting with the adversary model (step 1), our uncertainty about his
probabilities and utilities is propagated to his problem and leads to the corresponding random
optimal adversarial decisions which provide the required simulation.
3. Adopting defences. In this final step, we augment the defender problem incorporating the
attacker one produced in step 1. As output, we generate a BAID reflecting the confrontation
big picture. Finally, we solve the defender problem maximizing her subjective expected utility,
integrating out all attacker decisions, which are random from the defender perspective given the
lack of CK. In general, the corresponding integrals are approximated through MC, simulating
attacks consistent with our knowledge level about the attacker using the mechanism of step 2.
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5. AML from an ARA perspective
We illustrate now how the previous templates can be combined and adapted through the pro-
posed pipeline to provide support to AML models.
5.1. Adversarial supervised learning
Almost every supervised ML problem entails the tasks reflected in Figure 6: an inference (learn-
ing) stage, in which relevant information is extracted from training data T , and a decision
(operational) stage, in which a decision yD is made based on the gathered information.
yD
y x
uD
Tβ
Fig 6: Influence diagram for a supervised learning problem
In a general supervised learning problem under a Bayesian perspective, the first stage requires
computing the posterior p(β|T ) ∝ p(β)p(T |β), where p(β) is the prior on the model parameters;
T , the data; and p(T |β) the likelihood. Based on it, the predictive distribution is p(y|x, T ) =∫
p(y|x, β)p(β|T ) dβ. At the second stage, given an input x, the response yD has to be decided.
If the actual value is y, the attained utility is uD(y, yD) and, globally, the expected utility is
ψ(yD|x, T ) =
∫
y
uD(y, yD)p(y|x, T ) dy =
∫
y
uD(y, yD)
[∫
p(y|x, β)p(β|T ) dβ
]
dy.
We aim at finding arg maxyD ψ(yD|x, T ).
An attacker might be interested in modifying the inference stage, through poisoning attacks,
and/or the decision stage, through evasion attacks. Figure 7 represents both possibilities (step
3). In it, T ′ denotes the poisoned data and aT , the poisoning attack; aO denotes the evasion
attack decision and x′, the attacked feature vector actually observed by the defender. Finally, uA
designates the attacker’s utility function. If we just consider evasion attacks, aT is the identity,
T ′ = T , and inference will be as in Figure 6; when considering only poisoning attacks, aO would
be the identity, the observed instance x′ will coincide with x, and the decision stage is that in
Figure 6. Assume that attacks are deterministic transformations of data: applying an attack to
a given input will always lead to the same output.
Suppose the defender is not aware of the presence of the adversary. Then, she would receive
the training data T ′, use the posterior p(β|T ′), compute the predictive p(y|x, T ′), receive the
data x′ at operation time and solve arg maxyD ψD(yD|x′, T ′). This will typically differ from
arg maxyD ψD(yD|x, T ), leading to an undesired performance degradation as shown in Section
2. Should the defender know how she has been attacked, and assuming that attacks are invertible,
she would know a−1O (x
′) and a−1T (T ′) and maximise ψD(yD|a−1O (x′), a−1T (T ′)). However, she will
not typically know neither the attacks, nor the original data. Thus, upon becoming adversary
aware, she would deal with the problem in Figure 8, where now A’s decisions appear as random.
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yD x′
uA
y x aO
uD
aTTβ
T ′
Fig 7: Influence diagram for a generic adversarial supervised learning problem
yD x′
y x aO
uD
aTTβ
T ′
Fig 8: Supervised learning from the defender’s perspective
In such case, if her uncertainty is modelled through p(aT |T ′) and p(aO|x′), the defender would
optimise
(3)
∫ [∫
ψD(yD|a−1O (x′), a−1T (T ′))p(aT |T ′)daT
]
p(aO|x′)daO.
We describe a procedure to assess the required distributions following the methodology in
Section 4.4. To that end, (step 1) considers the problem that the attacker would be solving; (step
2) assesses our uncertainty about his problem to simulate from it; then, (step 3) the optimal
defence (3) is proposed.
The attacker aims at modifying data to maximize his utility uA(yD, y, aT , aO), that depends
on yD, y, and the attacks aT and aO, as these may have implementation costs. The form of
his utility function depends on his goals, 3.6. Given that the adversary observes (T , x, y), if we
assume that he aims at maximising expected utility when trying to confuse the defender, he
would find his best attacks through
(4) max
aT ,aO
∫
uA(yD, y, aT , aO)pA(yD|aO(x), aT (T )) dy,
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where pA(yD|aO(x), aT (T )) describes the probability that the defender says yD if she observes
the training data aT (T ) and features aO(x), from the adversary’s perspective. At this point, D
must model her uncertainty about A’s utilities and probabilities. She will use random utilities
UA and probabilities PA and look for the random optimal adversarial transformations
(5) (AT , AO)
∗(T , x, y) = arg max
aT ,aO
∫
UA(yD, y, aT , aO)PA(yD|aO(x), aT (T )) dy.
Finally, she computes the probability of the attacker choosing attacks aT and aO when observing
T , x, y as
(6) p(aT , aO|T , x, y) = P [(AT , AO)∗(T , x, y) = (aT , aO)] .
Using this, she would compute the required quantities p(aT |T ′) and p(aO|x′).
This last step is problem dependent. We illustrate some specificities through an application
to AC under evasion attacks.
5.2. Adversarial classification. An ARA perspective
Naveiro et al. (2019a) introduce ACRA, an approach to AC from an ARA perspective. This
is an application of the sketched framework to binary classification problems with malicious
(+) and benign (−) labels. ACRA considers only evasion attacks (aT = id) that are integrity
violations, thus exclusively affecting malicious examples. To unclutter notation, we remove the
dependence on training data T , clean by assumption. In addition, we eliminate the subscript in
evasion attacks and refer to them as a.
Figure 9a represents the problem faced by the defender. This BAID is the same as in Figure
8, removing the inference phase, standard by assumption. D aims at choosing the class yD
yD x′
y x a
uD
(a) Classifier problem
yD x′
y x a
uA
(b) Adversary problem
Fig 9
with maximum posterior expected utility based on the observed instance x′: she must find
c(x′) = arg maxyD
∑
y∈{+,−} uD(yD, y)pD(y|x′). Under the assumed type of attacks, this problem
is equivalent to
(7) c(x′) = arg max
yD
[
uD(yD,+)pD(+)
∑
x∈X ′
pD(ax→x′ |x,+)pD(x|+) + uD(yD,−)pD(x′|−)pD(−)
]
,
where X ′ is the set of potentially originating instances x leading to x′ and pD(ax→x′ |x,+)
designates the probability that A will launch an attack that transforms x into x′, when he
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receives (x, y = +), according toD. All required elements are standard except for pD(ax→x′ |x, y),
which demands strategic thinking from D.
To make the approach operational, consider A’s decision making, Figure 9b. Let uA(yD, y, a)
be A’s utility when D says yD, the actual label is y and the attack is a; and p = pA(c(a(x)) =
+|a(x)), the probability that A concedes to D saying the instance is malicious, given that
she observes x′ = a(x). He will have uncertainty about it; denote its density fA(p|a(x)) with
expectation pAa(x). Among all attacks, A would choose
a∗(x, y) = arg max
a
∫ [
uA(c(a(x)) = +, y, a) · p+ uA(c(a(x)) = −, y, a) · (1− p)
]
fA(p|a(x))dp.
Under integrity violation attacks, we only consider the case y = +. A’s expected utility, when he
adopts attack a and the instance is (x, y = +), is [uA(+,+, a)−uA(−,+, a)]pAa(x) +uA(−,+, a).
However, D does not know the ingredients uA and p
A
a(x). If her uncertainty is modelled through
a random utility function UA and a random expectation P
A
a(x), the random optimal attack is
A∗(x,+) = arg max
a
(
[UA(+,+, a)− UA(−,+, a)]PAa(x) + UA(−,+, a)
)
,
and pD(ax→x′ |x,+) = Pr(A∗(x,+) = ax→x′), which may be estimated using MC. This would
then feed problem (7). 8
Example. Applying the ACRA framework to the spam detection example in Section 2.2,
leads to the results in Table 2. Observe that ACRA is robust to attacks and identifies most of
the spam. Its overall accuracy is above 0.9, identifying most non-spam emails as well. ACRA
presents smaller FNR than NB-Tainted and significantly lower FPR than NB, causing the overall
performance to raise up.
Accuracy FPR FNR
ACRA 0.919± 0.010 0.019± 0.008 0.177± 0.022
NB-Plain 0.886± 0.009 0.680± 0.100 0.19± 0.02
NB-Tainted 0.761± 0.101 0.680± 0.100 0.500± 0.250
Table 2
Performance comparison of ACRA and utility sensitive Naive Bayes.
4
Interestingly, ACRA beats NB-Untainted in accuracy. This effect was observed in Dalvi et al.
(2004) and Goodfellow et al. (2015) in different settings. The latter argues that taking into
account the presence of an adversary has a regularizing effect improving the original accuracy
of the underlying algorithm, making it more robust.
5.3. Adversarial reinforcement learning. An ARA perspective
Section 3.4 described how the presence of other agents may make non-stationary the environ-
ment in RL, rendering Q-learning ineffective. To properly deal with the problem, consider the
extension of the simultaneous game in Section 4.2 to multiple stages, Figure 10. Figure 11
represents the problem from the perspective of just the defender.
To deal with this problem, the Markov Decision Process framework (Howard, 1960) has to be
augmented to account for the presence of adversaries. Consider the case of one agent (DM, D)
facing just one opponent (A). A Threatened Markov Decision Process (TMDP) (Gallego et al.,
8Relevant ways of modelling the random utilities and probabilities are available in Naveiro et al. (2019a).
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θ1 θ2 θ3
d1 d2 d3
a1 a2 a3
uA,1 uA,2
uA
uA,3
uD,1 uD,2 uD,3
uD
...
...
...
...
...
Fig 10: Multi-agent RL problem.
θ1 θ2 θ3
d1 d2 d3
a1 a2 a3
uD,1 uD,2 uD,3
uD
...
...
...
...
Fig 11: Defender view on multi-agent RL.
2019a,b) is a tuple (Θ,D,A,P, uD, pD) such that Θ designates the state space; D denotes the
set of actions d available to the supported agent; A designates the set of actions a available to
the adversary; P : Θ×D×A → ∆(Θ) is the transition distribution; uD : Θ×D×A → ∆(R) is
D’s utility distribution (denoted reward in the RL literature); and pD(a|θ) models D’s beliefs
about his opponent moves given the state θ ∈ Θ.
The effect of averaging over opponent actions is translated to the sequential setting, extending
the Q-learning iteration to
(8) Q(θ, d, a) := (1− α)Q(θ, d, a) + α
(
uD(θ, d, a) + γmax
d
EpD(a|θ′)
[
Q(θ′, d, a)
])
and its expectation, Q(θ, d) := EpD(a|θ) [Q(θ, d, a)]. This is used to compute an −greedy policy
for the DM, i.e., choosing with probability (1 − ) an action d∗ = arg maxd [Q(θ, d)], or, with
probability , a uniformly random action. The previous rule provides a fixed point of a con-
traction mapping, leading to a defender’s optimal policy, assuming her opponent behaviour is
described by pD(a|θ). Thus, it is key to model the uncertainty regarding the adversary’s policy
through this distribution. In Gallego et al. (2019a) we use a level-k scheme, Section 4.2, to
learn the opponent model: both agents maximize their respective expected cumulative utilities,
though we start with a case in which the adversary is considered non-strategic. Then, we also
consider the adversary being a level-1 agent and the DM a level-2 one. Gallego et al. (2019b)
goes up in the level-k hierarchy considering also mixtures of opponents whose beliefs can be
dynamically adapted by the DM. In most situations, D will not know which type of opponent
she is facing. For this, she can place a prior pD(Mi) modeling her beliefs about her opponent
using model Mi, i = 1, . . . ,m, with
∑m
i=1 pD(Mi) = 1, pD(Mi) ≥ 0. As an example, she might
place a Dirichlet prior. At each iteration, after having observed a, she updates her beliefs p(Mi)
increasing the count of the model causing that action, as in a standard Dirichlet-Categorical
model. For this, the defender maintains an estimate pMi(a|s) of the opponent’s policy for each
model Mi.
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Example. Consider the benefits of opponent modelling in a repeated matrix game, specifically
the iterated variant of the Chicken game (IC), with payoff matrix in Table 3. For example, if
the row agent plays C and the column one plays E, the agents respectively obtain utilities
of −2 and 1. This game has two pure NE (C,E) and (E,C). Fig. 12a depicts the utilities
C E
C (0, 0) (-2, 1)
E (1, -2) (-4, -4)
Table 3
Payoff Matrix of Chicken
obtained over time by players, when both agents are modelled as independent Q-learners (they
use the standard Q-function from RL as learning rule). Observe the ill convergence due to lack
of opponent awareness. As mentioned in Section 3.4, when other agents interfere with a DM’s
rewards, the environment can become non-stationary and Q-learning leads to suboptimal results
(Bus¸oniu et al., 2010).
(a) Q-learner vs Q-learner (b) L1 Q-learner (blue) vs Q-learner (red)
Fig 12: Rewards in IC game.
Alternatively (Fig. 12b), the DM with opponent modelling, based on (8) to estimate the oppo-
nent’s actions with historical frequencies, has an advantage and converges to her optimal Nash
equilibrium (E,C). 4
6. Conclusions: A research agenda
We have provided a review of key approaches, models and concepts in AML. This area is of
major importance in security and cybersecurity to protect systems increasingly based on ML
algorithms, Comiter (2019). The pioneering AC work by Dalvi et al. (2004) has framed most
of this research within the game-theoretic realm, with entailed CK conditions which actually
hardly hold in the security contexts typical of AML. Our ARA alternative framework does not
entail such conditions, being therefore much more realistic. As a byproduct, we obtain more
robust algorithms. We illustrated their application in adversarial supervised learning, AC and
RL problems. We end up providing several lines for further research.
6.1. Robustifying ML algorithms through Bayesian ideas
We argued how Bayesian methods provide enhanced robustness in AML. Ekin et al. (2019) shows
how game theory solutions based on point estimates of preferences and beliefs, potentially lead
to unstable solutions, while ARA solutions tend to be more robust acknowledging uncertainties
in such judgements. Here are some additional ideas.
Bayesian methods and AML. It has been empirically shown that model ensembling is an
effective mechanism for designing powerful attack models (Trame`r et al., 2018). The Bayesian
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treatment of ML models offers a way of combining the predictions of different models via the
predictive distribution. Gal and Smith (2018) show how certain idealized Bayesian NNs properly
trained lack adversarial examples. Thus, a promising research line consists of developing efficient
algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference with robustness guarantees.
Indeed, there are several ways in which the Bayesian approach may increase security of ML
systems. Regarding opponent modelling, in sequential decision making, an agent has uncertainty
over her opponent type initially; as information is gathered, she might be less uncertain about
her model via Bayesian updating (Gallego et al., 2019b). Uncertainty over attacks in supervised
models can also be considered to obtain a more robust version of AT, as in Ye and Zhu (2018)
who sample attacks using a SG-MCMC method. Combining their approach with ARA opponent
modelling may further increase robustness. Lastly, there are alternative approaches to achieve
robustness in presence of outliers and perturbed observations, as through the robust divergences
for variational inference (Futami et al., 2018).
Robust Bayesian methods. The robust Bayesian literature burgeoned in the period 1980-
2000 (Berger, 1982; Rios Insua and Ruggeri, 2000). In particular, there has been relevant work in
Bayesian likelihood robustness (Shyamalkumar, 2000) referring to likelihood imprecision, remi-
niscent of the impact of attacks over the data received. Note that Bayesian likelihood robustness
focuses around random or imprecise perturbations and contaminations in contrast to the pur-
poseful perturbations in AML. Not taking into account the presence of an adversary affecting
data generation is an example of model mispecification; robustness of Bayesian inference to
such issue has been revisited recently in Miller and Dunson (2019). Their ideas could be used
to robustify ML algorithms in adversarial contexts.
6.2. Modelling and computational enhancements
We discuss modelling and computational enhancements aimed at improving operational aspects
of the proposed framework.
Characterizing attacks. A core element in the AML pipeline is the choice of the attacker
perturbation domain. This is highly dependent on the nature of the data attacked. In computer
vision, a common choice is an `p ball of radius δ centered at the original input. For instance,
an `∞ norm implies that an attacker may modify any pixel by at most δ. These perturbations,
imperceptible to the human eye, may not be representative of threats actually deployed. As an
example, Brown et al. (2017) designed a circular sticker that may be printed and deployed to
fool state of the art classifiers. Thus, it is important to develop threat models that go beyond `p
norm assumptions. Moreover, we discussed only problems with two agents. It is relevant to deal
with multiple agents in several variants (one defender vs. several attackers, several defenders
vs. several attackers) including cases in which agents on one of the sides somehow cooperate.
New algorithmic approaches. Exploring gradient-based techniques for bi-level optimization
problems arising in AML is a fruitful line of research (Naveiro and Insua, 2019). However the
focus has been on white box attacks. It would be interesting to extend those results to the
framework here proposed. On the other hand, Bayesian methods are also hard to scale to high
dimensional problems or large datasets. Recent advances in accelerating SG-MCMC samplers,
e.g., Gallego and Insua (2019, 2018), are crucial to leverage the benefits of a Bayesian treatment.
Single stage computations. The framework proposed in Sections 4 and 5 essentially goes
through simulating from the attacker problem to forecast attacks and then optimize for the
defender to find her optimal decision. This may be computationally demanding and we could
explore single stage approaches to alleviate computations. Initial ideas based on augmented
probability simulation are in Ekin et al. (2019).
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6.3. Adversarial machine learning methods
As mentioned in Section 4, our approach could be used to study adversarial versions of ML
problems (classification, regression, unsupervised learning and RL). We are particularly inter-
ested in the following.
Adversarial classification. A main limitation of ACRA, Section 5.2, is the requirement of
computing the conditional probabilities p(x|y): this is only compatible with explicit generative
models, such as Naive Bayes. This model can be weak as it does not account for feature correla-
tions. A straightforward extension can be using a deep Bayes classifier with a VAE. 9 Likewise,
extensions to discriminative models and multi-class problems is on-going.
Unsupervised learning. Further research is required. As for non-hierarchical methods such
as k-means clustering, we could treat f(x) = arg maxy ‖x− µy‖−1 as a score function, so stan-
dard evasion techniques (Section 3) could straightforwardly be applied. Security of AR models
(Alfeld et al., 2016) and natural language models (Wang et al., 2019) are attracting attention,
so custom defences tailored to these models are in need.
6.4. Applications
As presented in Comiter (2019), applications abound. We mention five of interest to us.
Fake news. The rise in computer power used in deep learning is leading to quasi-realistic auto-
matic text generation (Radford et al., 2019), which can be used for malicious purposes such as
fake reviews generation (Juuti et al., 2018). At present, state of the art defences consist mostly of
statistical analyses of token distributions (Gehrmann et al., 2019). These are attacker-agnostic.
An ARA treatment may be beneficial to inform the model of which are the most likely attack
patterns.
Autonomous driving systems. ADS directly benefit from developments in computer vision
and RL. However, accidents still occur because of lack of guarantees in verifying the correct-
ness of deep NNs. Alternative solutions include the use of Bayesian NNs, as there is evidence
that uncertainty measures can predict crashes up to five seconds in advance (Michelmore et al.,
2018). McAllister et al. (2017) propose propagating the uncertainty over the network to achieve
a safer driving style. As mentioned, adversaries may interact with the visual system through
adversarial examples. Thus, developing stronger defences are of major importance.
Forecasting time series. Industrial and business settings are pervaded by data with strong
temporal dependencies, with structured data generating processes. An attacker might be in-
terested in intruding a defender network without alerting a monitoring system, extending the
framework in Naveiro et al. (2019b), based on dynamic linear models (West and Harrison, 1989).
Thus, an adversarial framework for these models would be of great interest.
Malware detection. Its methods are traditionally classified in three categories (Nath and
Mehtre, 2014): static, dynamic and hybrid approaches. Shabtai et al. (2009) describe how ML
algorithms may accomplish accurate classification to detect new malware. Note though that no
ARA based AML methods have been used yet in this domain.
Causal inference. The problem of causal inference in observational studies is inevitably con-
fronted with sample selection bias, which arises when units choose whether they are exposed
to treatment (Heckman, 1979). In ML terminology, such bias occurs when the test set of coun-
terfactual data is drawn from a true distribution and the training set of factual data is drawn
from a biased distribution, where the support of biased distribution is included in that of the
true distribution (Cortes et al., 2008). AML can be used to learn balanced representations of
factual and counterfactual data, thereby minimizing the risk of selection bias. Bica et al. (2020),
for instance, use domain-adversarial training (Ganin et al., 2015) to trade-off between building
9See Gallego and Insua (2019) for an implementation in a non-adversarial setting.
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balanced representations and estimating counterfactual outcomes in a longitudinal data setting.
Glossary
AC: Adversarial Classification
ACRA: AC based on adversarial risk analysis
ADS: Autonomous Driving System
AI: Artificial Intelligence
AML: Adversarial Machine Learning
APP: Adversarial Prediction Problem
AR: Autoregressive
ARA: Adversarial Risk Analysis
AT: Adversarial Training
BAID: Bi-agent Influence Diagram
BNE: Bayes Nash equilibrium
CK: Common Knowledge
DM: Decision Maker
FNR: False Negative Rate
FPR: False Positive Rate
ID: Influence Diagram
ML: Machine Learning
MC: Monte Carlo
NB: Naive Bayes
NE: Nash Equilibrium
NN: Neural Network
PGD: Projected Gradient Descent
RL: Reinforcement Learning
SG-MCMC: Stochastic Gradient Markov
Chain Monte Carlo
TMDP: Threatened Markov Decision
Process
VAE: Variational Autoencoder
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